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The findings  reported in this paper are based on data from a 1998 Uganda Enterprise
Survey  carried  out  by  the  Uganda Manufacturers Association Consultancy and
Information  Service  (UMACIS)  on behalf of the Ugandan  Private Sector Foundation  and
the World Bank, and was managed  by William Kalema and Frances Nzonsi. We thank
the Governments  of Austria and Sweden for their generous financial support of the
survey.1.  Introduction
Until fairly recently, the traditional  approach to growth in the development eco-
normics  literature  (and in policy formation) was rather  mechanical: growth was
constrained by lack of investment which, in turn,  was constrained by lack of fi-
nance.  Consequently, if finance were made available, it was argued, investment
would follow (Easterly, 1997).  Although  underdeveloped financial systems are
found to be associated with poor economic  performance in cross-country regres-
sions (King and Levine, 1993), evidence from several African countries indicates
that  lack of liquidity typically only constrains the capital accumulation of house-
hold and small enterprises, but on average not that  of larger firms (Bigsten et al.,
1999). Hence, factors other than finance must explain the apparent reluctance of
firms to invest and expand.
In the extensive cross-country growth literature,  the role of macroeconomic
policy, proxied by government budget deficits, black-market premiums, and infla-
tion (see for instance Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro, 1991; Fisher, 1993), has
been identified as a key policy measure influencing both  efficiency and level of
investment and growth. However,  despite recent macroeconomic  reforms in many
developing countries, the private investment response has been disappointing, par-
ticularly in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Uganda is a good example. Over
the past decade, Uganda has consistently liberalized its economy,  and now has one
of the best macroeconomic environments in Africa. Still, the investment response
is not significantly different from other African countries with significantly worse
macroeconomic environments (Reinikka and Svensson, 1999).
2The role of poor infrastructure and deficient public services has received little
attention  in the economic literature.  The existing empirical evidence, based on
cross-country data,  indicates that  the effect of public spending and  investment
on growth is at  best  ambiguous (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Easterly  and
Rebelo,1993; Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou, 1996).'
This ambiguity may simply be a problem of identification; more spending does
not necessarily imply more public capital or services (Pritchett,  1996; Ablo and
Reinikka, 1998;  Svensson, 1999a). In fact, when output measures of public capital,
such as telephones per worker, rather  than spending have been used to proxy
infrastructure  constraints, a positive relationship between infrastructure quality
and growth emerges (Easterly and Levine, 1997). However,  as with other outcome
measures in cross-country regressions, the direction of causality is unclear, thus
making it difficult to assess the relationship.
We avoid the identification problem by using unique microeconomic  evidence
to show the effects  of poor infrastructure services  on private investment in Uganda.
We find that  poor public capital,  proxied by unreliable and inadequate public
power supply, significantly reduces productive investment by firms. The microe-
conomic data  also shows us how firms cope with  deficient public capital:  when
public provision of services and infrastructure is poor they can invest in comple-
mentary capital themselves. However,  there is a cost: less productive capital will
be installed.
lEasterly  and  Rebelo (1993) find that  overall public investment has  a very low impact  on
growth, but that  certain types of investment expenditures are correlated with growth. Devara-
jan,  Swaroop, and  Zou (1996) find that  the  standard  candidates  for productive  expenditures
had either a negative or insignificant relationship with growth.
3These results have clear policy implications. Although macroeconomic  reforms
and stabilization are necessary conditions for sustained growth and private invest-
ment, without an accompanying improvement in the public sector's performance,
the private supply response to macroeconomic  policy reform is likely to remain
limited.
The rest  of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the stylized
facts of deficient public capital from the viewpoint of firms. Section 3 sets out a
simple two-period model highlighting the relationship between firms' productive
investment and availability of complementary capital. The model captures salient
features of low-income  economies  by assuming absence of a credit market, deficient
supply of publicly provided complementary capital,  and  uncertainty  about  its
future improvement. Section 4 tests the model empirically using recent firm survey
data from Uganda. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Deficient  public  capital:  A  case  study  of  a  developing
country
This section stylizes some facts about deficient public capital in a typical low-
income developing country. The data  come from a recent (1998) firm survey in
Uganda that  collects information on infrastructure  services and  private invest-
ment.  The survey covered a total  of 243 firms for the period 1995-97 (Reinikka
and Svensson, 1999).
We define complementary capital as capital  that  provides support  services
necessary for the operation of productive private capital (e.g.  transport  infras-
tructure,  such as roads, ports, and railways; or utilities, such as electricity, water,
4and telephone). In low-income  countries complementary capital is typically pub-
licly provided. In certain cases the firm can substitute for deficient public services
by investing privately in complementary capital (e.g. electric power generators or
waste disposal). However,  some types of complementary capital, such as transport
infrastructure, cannot easily be substituted.
Is poor public service  perceived to be an important constraint for firms? Figure
1 ranks firm managers' perceptions on a wide range of constraints to investment.
Managers rated poor utility services (and the cost of utility services) as the most
binding constraint.  Unreliable and  inadequate electricity was ranked as  most
binding by most firms, followed  by telephone services, roads, and waste disposal.
Although most firms (94 percent) were connected to the public grid, power supply
was ranked as a major obstacle for every sector and size category of firms, whether
foreign or domestic. Responses suggest that  the supply of electricity had in fact
worsened in the recent years.
The quantitative information reveals a similar picture.  On average, the firms
surveyed did not  receive electricity from the  public grid, a monopoly supplier,
for 89 operating days  (adding up all the  part  or full days) a year (74 days at
the median).  As a  result, many firms invested in a  back-up power generator.
As many as 77 percent of large firms, 44 percent of medium-sized firms, and  16
percent of small-sized  firms owned generators. The cost of generators represented
16 percent of the value of total  investment, on average, and 25 percent  of the
value of investment in  equipment and  machinery in  1997.  Moreover, the data
suggest that  it costs about three times more to run and own a generator than to
buy power from the public grid (when it is available). Errors in billing occurred
3 months per year, on average.
5Despite the generally poor quality of public electricity service, there were large
variations across firms in terms of days without power (figure 2). These variations
were partly the result of unreliable power supply in general, and partly the result
of service on specific power lines.  For instance, interviews with firm managers
suggested that  firms connected to  "priority" lines (i.e., power lines that  connect
important  army facilities) were more likely to receive reliable power supply.
Access  to public telephone service  varied by location and firm  size. On average,
it took  13 weeks to obtain  a telephone connection.  Over one-half of the  firms
invested in mobile phones (a privately run service) because public service was so
inefficient. Firms tried an average 2.5 times to complete a local call, 4.6 times
to  complete a long-distance call within Uganda, 4 times to complete a call to  a
neighboring country, and 2.8 times to complete an international call.
One-third of the firms reported having access to public waste disposal services,
but few could actually rely on them.  Eight percent of firms used a private provider
and 77 percent disposed of their own waste. Similar problems plagued other public
capital services, including water supply  (firms reported  33 days of inadequate
supply in a year), postal services (only 31 percent of business correspondence was
delivered by the public post office),  ports and airports, road and rail services.
Altogether, the summary statistics  suggest that  the magnitude of the  poor
infrastructure  and  deficient public services is considerable, and therefore might
have significant effects on firms' investment and business decisions. In section 4
we formally test if this is the case, and in the next section we present a simple
model to guide the empirical work.
63.  Model
Consider  the  following two-period  model.  A  manager  maximizes  the  expected
discounted  cash  flow according  to the  following quasi-linear  preference  function
w(di, d2) = u(di)  + E3d2 (3.1)
where  dt,  t  =  1, 2, is cash  flow in  period  t,  /3 is a  discount  factor,  E  is an  ex-
pectation  operator,  and  u(.)  is a  strictly  increasing  concave  function.  The  firm
(manager)  starts  period  1 with  retained  earnings  e, and  must  decide  how to  al-
locate  these  earnings  between  dividends  in present  period  (d1)  and  investment  i
and  thereby  expected  dividends  in period  2 (d2).
The  return  to  private  productive  capital,  i,  depends  on  the  availability  of
complementary  capital.  There  is uncertainty  about  the  availability  and  quality  of
publicly  provided  complementary  capital.  However, firms can remove  the  uncer-
tainty  by  substituting  public  capital  for private  substitutes,  but  there  is a fixed
cost  of doing  so.  In  period  1, the  manager  decides  whether  or not  to  buy  com-
plementary  capital;  that  is, private  substitutes,  denoted  by  ,',  where  i,  =  {O,  i}.
In period  1, the  manager  also determines  the  amount  of investment,  denoted  by
i.  Capital  becomes  productive  in period  2, according  to  the  production  function
f (i).
Without  adequate  complementary  public  capital,  the  return  to  private  invest-
ment  is uncertain.  The net  return  is given  by qf (i).  To simplify, we assume  that
q can  take  two values,  q and  q, with  q > r  >  q.  The probability  of event  ff [  is
p4 [{P]. Let  qe denote  expected  q; that  is, qe =  pqq + pqq.
With  private  complementary  capital  installed,  the  firm can ensure  at  least the
net  return  rf  (i),  where  f  >  r  >  q.  If public  provision  turns  out  to  be  available
7and of good quality, the net return  qf (i) is higher. 2 Thus, the net return  for a
firm with installed complementary capital is max [q,  r] f (i).  q is observed at the
beginning of period 2.
We assume an incomplete credit market, implying that  firms can only invest
from retained earnings, e. The budget constraint in period 1 is then simply
d, + i + ic < e . (3.2)
The firm's problem can be solved by working backwards. In period 1, the firm
determines the amount of investment, i.  The first-order conditions for the two
'types' of firms are
-u'(di)  + I3ref(i)  =  0  if K  =  K  (3.3)
and
-u'(di)  +3,qef'(i) =O  if K = 0  (3.4)
where re _  pqq + pqr.  Equations (3.3) and (3.4), together with the budget con-
straint  (3.2), implicitly define the investment functions
ii =  IP(e,  ,',re,  K)  (3.5)
io = Io°(e,  o3,  qe)  (3.6)
where il  is the investment function for a firm that installed complementary capital
(K  =  R), io is the investment function for a firm that  did not  (K  = 0).  Using the
investment functions (3.5) and (3.6), and budget constraint  (3.2), to  substitute
2 This  seems  like  a reasonable  assumption  since  complementary  capital typically  involves  large
fixed  costs  and therefore  can be supplied  cheaper  through large-scale  production. As an example,
the firm survey revealed  that it costs about three times more to run and own a generator  for
power  than to buy power  from  the public  grid.
8into  (3.1),  yields  the  indirect  expected  utility  functions,  we (e, re, R  |K  = K) and
w  (e, qe  i  =  0).
Will the firm invest in complementary  capital  itself?  Installing  private  substi-
tutes  is an optimal  response  if the  expected  utility  of buying  private  substitutes
and  investing according  to (3.5) is higher than  the expected  utility  of relying solely
on public  capital  and  investing  according  to  (3.6).  That  is, a firm  invests  K  = K
if,
we  (e,r',  K  Jr, = K) - We  (e,  q'  IK = 0) > O . (3.7)
Let  qe  be the cutoff value of qe  such that
we  (e,  r,  K |K  = K)  - we  (e,  q  Jr = 0)  =  0  (3.8)
holds.  If the  firm  expects  poor  quality  of complementary  public  capital;  that  is
qe  <  qe,  the  firm  will buy  private  complementary  capital.  If the  firm  expects
publicly  provided  complementary  capital  of high  quality;  that  is qe >  qe, it  will
rely solely on public  capital.
The investment  functions  (3.5) and  (3.6),  and  the  complementary  capital  de-
cision  (3.8) have  some interesting  characteristics.  First,  for  a firm  that  installed
private  substitutes  (, = K),  investment  is independent  of qe*  Thus,  as illustrated
in  figure  3,  a  fall  in  the  expected  quality  of publicly  provided  complementary
capital  (due  to  a lower q) has no  effect on desired  investment  rate  for firms with
K  = K,  but  would  result  in lower private  investment  for a firm with  rK  =  0.3
3This asymmetry  is due to  the  fact  that  firms with  K  =  ic will always exploit their  own
privately  provided  stock  of complementary  capital  when public  capital  provision  is poor,  yielding
a certain  return  r  on investment.  Thus,  a lower  q has  no effect.  Note  though  that,  for  example,
a  reduction  in  the  probability  of  efficient  public  capital  provision  (pq),  would  lower  private
investment  for both  "types"  of firms,  since both  re and qe would fall.  However,  a lower pq would
reduce  the  expected  return  to private  investment  for a type  1 firm  (with  X =  )  more  than  the
9Second, a  fall  in the  expected quality  of public capital  would also  affect
the  decision to  buy private substitutes.  Note that  ddk [we  (. In = 0)] >  0, and
dd  [we  I  n  =  EC)]  0, implying that  dq/dqe  >  0.  Hence, a fall in the expected
quality of public capital would reduce the cutoff value 4 for which it  becomes
optimal to install private substitutes.  Thus, the incentives to 'insure' against bad
states increase.
Third, private substitutes  crowd-out productive capital; that  is, dl'/dR  < 0.
As illustrated figure 3, higher costs of complementary  private substitutes, shift the
I'-curve  down, as resources that  could be utilized for productive public capital is
now used to finance private substitutes.  If rc  is sufficiently  large, 1I >  I1 for high
qe
Finally, a mean-preserving spread in q would also result in more firms buying
private substitutes.  That  is, even though firms are risk neutral with respect to
second period cash flows, an increase in the variance of the return q, holding the
expected return  qe constant, increases the incentives to buy private substitutes.
Intuitively, the option value that  follows  an installation of complementary capital;
that is, the possibility of getting return r when publicly provided capital is of poor
quality (q) increases when the variance in q increases. 4 This result resembles one
of the key findings in recent investment under uncertainty theory (see Dixit and
Pindyck 1994, for a comprehensive review; and Pattillo,  1997; Svensson, 1999b,
for empirical support).  The so-called option approach views investment policy
as balancing the value of waiting for new information with the cost of foregone
fall in expected  return to private investment  for a type 2 firm (with Is = 0). As a result, more
firms would find it optimal to buy private substitutes.
4A mean-preserving spread implies a higher q and a lower q. Note that  a firm with n =  k is
"insured" against the  bad outcome (q), but  will take advantage of the good outcome (q).
10returns.  When  a firm  makes  an  irreversible  investment  it gives up  its  option  to
wait.  In this paper  we have implicitly  assumed  away the option-to-wait  incentive,
since the  firm is presumed  to  always invest in period  1. However, we end up  with
a similar  result  since firms have the opportunity  to install  its own complementary
capital,  thereby  receiving  an option  value on potential  future  returns.
The  effect  of a  mean-preserving  spread  can be illustrated  graphically.  Figure
4  plots  the  relationship  between  investment  rates  and  expected  quality  of the
publicly  provided  complementary  capital  for two types  of firms:
Type  1. a firm facing an uncertain  q with  high variance;
Type  2. a firm facing an uncertain  q with  low variance.
If the  firms expect  qe  to  be  larger  than  q' but  smaller  than  q", only  the  firm
facing high variance will choose to buy insurance  by investing in private  substitute,
at  the  cost  of less productive  capital  installed.  Thus,  if the  expected  quality  of
public  capital  is sufficiently good, a firm facing low variance might  choose not buy
private  substitutes  and  to  invest more  in productive  capacity.
4.  Testing  the  model
4.1.  Empirical  specification
In this  section,  we test  the  implication  of the model  on a sample  of 171 Ugandan
establishments.  The two key equations  in the model  are the investment  functions
(3.5)  and  (3.6).  FRom (3.5)  and  (3.6)  it  follows  that  for  firms  with  installed
complementary  capital,  investment  should  be independent  of qe (or q),  while for
firms that  lack complementary  capital,  investment  should  be a negative  function
of qe.  Moreover, complementary  capital  crowds  out private  investment.  Provided
11that  the quality of public capital is sufficiently  good, a firm that  installs private
substitutes might even invest less than a firm that does not (as illustrated in figure
4).
To estimate equations (3.5) and (3.6) we make linear approximations of Io(.)
and I,(.),  and replace the unobserved qe with a proxy of realized q, plus a forecast
error, 6. Nesting equations (3.5) and (3.6) then yields a testable model
a  ao + a7ri  + a.p,3  + aeei  + adpt + adpiq + a!qi +  i  (4.1)
where pi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if firm i has invested in comple-
mentary public capital and 0 otherwise.
4.2.  Data
The data  used to  estimate  equation (4.1) comes from the Ugandan Industrial
Enterprise Survey (Reinikka  and Svensson, 1999). The survey was initiated by the
World Bank primarily to collect data on the constraints facing private enterprises
in Uganda, and it was implemented during January-June  1998. A total  of 243
firms were interviewed in 5 locations, in  14 different subindustries  (three-digit
ISIC). We were unable to collect detailed cost and sales or investment data for all
firms. Thus we ended up with a smaller sample of 171 firms.
The dependent  variable, the  investment rate,  is measured as investment in
machinery and equipment in 1997 excluding potential investment in generators,
as a share of the previous period's  capital stock, inv.  As a proxy for pi, com-
plementary public capital, we use installed electric power generators (generator).
This is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm reported that  it owned a
generator at the end of the sample period, and 0 otherwise. A logical proxy for q
12is then the reported number of days in 1997 that  the firm did not receive power
from the public grid (lostdays).
Retained earnings, el is proxied by profits, measured as sales less operating
costs and interest payments (profit),  The unobserved parameters r'  and  Bi3  are
proxied by total employment (size)  and age (age). The presumption is that  larger
and  more established firms are more likely to have access to  lower cost capital
(external finance). The empirical model is hence
inv'  = a x  + cadgeneratoe  + aqlostdays'  + adqgenerator t * lostdays'  + s'  (4.2)
where xi  =  [age',  sizei, profit'].  To minimize heteroscedasticity problem with
respect to size, investment and profits are scaled by the inverse of the end of the
previous period capital stock.
4.3.  Results
Before proceeding to the results it is useful to take an initial look at some of the
data.  Table 1 reports summary statistics  for the 171 firm sample.  40 percent  of
the firms owned a generator by the end of the sample period.  The size of the
generator varied greatly, with a mean of roughly 270 KVA [median 140 KVAI and
a standard  deviation of 550 KVA, and is highly correlated with the size of the
firm. The simple correlation between employment size and owning a generator is
0.37.
As depicted in table 2, firms with installed generators typically are larger, and
reported more days in 1997 without power from the public grid. Both results are
in accordance with the model.  A fall in the expected quality of public capital
increases the incentives to buy private substitutes,  and due to indivisibilities in
13t.,  larger firms will find it easier to  match available private substitutes to  their
needs. The two types of firms are similar with respect to age and profit rate  (at
the median).
Table 3 reports a series of regression, corresponding  to equation (4.2). As evi-
dent, all three variables of primary interest, lostdays, generator and the interactive
term; enter highly significant. 5 In accordance with the model, the investment level
of firms with installed generators is quantitatively independent of q, whereas for
firms with no generator, investmnent  is negatively related to number of lost days. 6
Interestingly, firms that  had installed complementary capital and experienced few
lost days, invested less than firms that  did not have a generator.  This supports
the notion that  private complementary capital indeed crowds out private invest-
ment; that is, firms that  install complementary capital invest less than firms that
do not, provided that  the quality of public capital is sufficiently  good. 7 Regression
2 is illustrated in figure 5. The estimated magnitude of deficient public capital on
investment is large. For a firm that  relies solely on public capital, a one-standard-
deviation deterioration in power supply (evaluated at the mean), would result in
an 11-percentage point drop in the investment rate.
To test the robustness of the results, we add additional controls to the base
specification in regressions 2-5. Regression 2 adds change in sales (Asales).  Ac-
5 One extreme outlier is dropped.  Including this observation increases the standard  errors on
generator and the  interactive term  (generator-lostdays). However, the  three variables of main
interest;  lostdays, generator, and  generator-lostdays are still jointly  significant (F-statistic  on
the joint hypothesis of zero coefficients  is 3.37).
6We cannot reject the null-hypothesis that  aq - adq  =  0.  The F-statistic  is 0.21 with p-value
0.65.
7Note that  there  is not only a fixed cost of investing in private complementary capital,  but
that  there are also additional maintenance and operating costs. As noted in footnote 2, the data
reveals it costs three  times more to own and  operate  a generator for power than  to by power
from the public grid.
14cording to  a traditional  accelerator model,  investment is positively related  to
demand changes (see for instance Tybout,  1983). However, once we control for
profit, A sales has no significant impact.  In regression 3, the base specification
is augmented with  a measure of capacity utilization (capacity), and  in  regres-
sion 4, with the percentage of foreign ownership (foreign).  As evident, neither
variable enters significantly. In all three regressions, lostdays, generator, and the
interactive term, remain highly significant.
Regression 5 adds a proxy of the firm managers' perception of the  overall
quality  of public capital  (infrastructure services).  The variable quality enters
significantly positive (at the 10 percent level) without affecting the variables of
primary interest.
As a further check on robustness of the findings we report the results of some
additional  sensitivity analysis in  table  4.  The  estimated residuals tend  to  be
larger for the larger firms in the sample (as measured by log of employment).
As a possible correction for this heteroscedasticity, we re-estimated the model by
weighting observations with employment. The results are shown in regressions 1
and 2 of table 4. Apart from the perception score quality, which no longer enters
significantly,  the results remain similar to those reported in table 3.
In table 5 we re-estimate the model (4.2) with all variables in logs. This has
the well-known advantage that  the coefficients  can be interpreted as elasticities.
However, since both profit and investment can take negative values, we have to
add constants to these terms. This in turn implies that the elasticity of investment
with respect to these variables are not constant. Column 2 displays the estimated
elasticities evaluated at the mean. For a firm lacking private substitutes of com-
plementary capital, a one-percent increase in the number of days without power,
15results  in a  0.45 percent  reduction  in investment.  As in previous  regressions,  we
cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  gq  - adq  =  0.  Thus,  an  increase  in  number  of
days  lost  has  no  statistically  significant  effect  on investment  for firms with  their
own generators.
5.  Conclusion
The  role of poor  infrastructure  and  deficient  public  services  in determining  level
of private  capital  accumulation  has  received relatively  little  attention  in the  eco-
nomic  literature,  and  the  existing  empirical  evidence  suggest  that  the  effect  of
public  spending  and  investment  on growth  is at  best  ambiguous.  This  ambiguity
may  simply  be  a  problem  of identification;  more  spending  does  not  necessarily
imply  more  productive  public  capital  or  services.  By  using  firm-level  data  on
outcomes,  we overcome  this  identification  problem.  We show  that  poor  public
capital  significantly  reduces  productive  investment  by  firms.  The microeconomic
data  also shows how firms cope with deficient public  capital:  when public  services
are poor  they  can  invests  privately  in  complementary  capital.  However, there  is
a cost:  less productive  capital  will be installed.
The  results  have  clear  policy  implications.  If  a  substantial  share  of firms'
cost items  is attributable  to the  poorly  functioning  public  sector,  which is beyond
firms' control,  private  supply  responses  to macroeconomic  policy  reform  are likely
to  remain  limited  without  an  accompanying  improvement  in the  public  sector's
performance.  Thus,  although  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  are  neces-
sary  conditions  for  sustainable  improvement  in the  private  sector,  they  may  not
be sufficient  to achieve sustained  growth  and  capital  accumulation.
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18Table 1. Summary  Statistics
Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. dev.
employment  114  29  5  2,000  252
log(employment)  3.62  3.37  1.61  7.60  1.41
age  13.1  10.0  1  73  12.4
age (log)  2.16  2.30  0  4.29  0.97
profit rate  0.72  0.26  -2.63  9.17  1.55
lostdays  88.7  74  0  365  69.1
log(l +lostdays)  4.04  4.32  0  5.90  1.24
observations  171  171  171  171  171
Table 2. Summary  Statistics
Owns a generator  Does not own a generator
Mean  Median  Mean  Median
employment  229  100  36  19
age  14.9  11.0  11.9  8.5
profit  rate  0.52  0.28  0.85  0.25
lostdays  102  90  80  60
capacity  273  138
observations  69  69  102  102Table 3. Investment Regressions(i)  u(ii)(iv)
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dependent variable  inv  inv  inv  inv  inv
constant  .407***  .386***  .398***  .411  .283**
(.110)  (.112)  (.120)  (.111)  (.129)
profit  .054*  .047  .052***  .054*  .052***
(.014)  (.015)  (.014)  (.014)  (.014)
employment  (log)  6.8E-4  -.001  -5.5E-4  .005  .004
(.018)  (.018)  (.018)  (.018)  (.018)
age (log)  -.041*  -.037'  -.040*  -.044**  -.042**
(.021)  (.021)  (.022)  (.022)  (.021)
lostdays (log)  -.073  -.068  -.076  -.074  -.069
(.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)
lostdays(log) *generator  .087*  .081**  .089**  .084**  .098**
(.037)  (.037)  (.037)  (.037)  (.037)
generator  -.329**  -.301*  -.336**  -.311*  -.379**









F-statistic(v)  4.51  3.88  4.65  4.59  4.22
(.005)  (.010)  (.004)  (.004)  (.007)
AdjustedR  R.15  .15  .14  .15  .16
Observations  170  170  168  170  169
Note: (i) dependent  variable is investment  in machinery  in equipment  to previous period's capital  stock;
(ii) OLS regressions;  (iii) standard  errors in parenthesis;  (iv) *** (**) [*J denotes significance  at the 1,
5,  and  10  percent  level;  (v)  F-test  the  joint  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients on  lostdays,
lostdays*generator,  generator  are zero, with p-values  in parentheses.Table  4. Investment  Regressions(i)>(ii)0(iii)O(iv)
Equation  (1)  (2)
Dependent variable  inv  inv
constant  .353  .346*
(.108)  (.121)
profit  .037***  .037
(.012)  (.013)
employment (log)  .004  .004
(.015)  (.015)
age (log)  -.050  -.050
(.018)  (.018)
lostdays (log)  -.052**  -.051 **
(.021)  (.021)
lostdays(log) *generator  .074*  .074**
(.030)  (.031)




F-statistic(V)  2.44  2.47
(.066)  (.064)
Adjusted R  .13  .13
Observations  170  169
Nate:  (i)  dependent variable is investment in  machinery in
equipment  to  previous  period's  capital  stock;  (ii)  WLS
regressions with employment as weight; (iii) standard errors in
parenthesis; (iv) *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1, 5,
and  10 percent level; (v) F-test the joint  hypothesis that the
coefficients  on lostdays,  lostdays*generator,  generator  are  zero,
with p-values in parentheses.Table 5. Investment Regressions(i),(1i)((iii),(iV)I(v)
Equation  (1)  (2)
Dependent  variable  log(l +inv)  % change
constant  .067
(.082)
log(3+profit)  .134***  0.34
(.035)
log(employment)  .005  0.06
(.010)
age (log)  -.030*  0.40
(.013)
lostdays (log)  -.034*  0.45
(.012)






Adjusted R2  .121
Observations  170  170
Note: (i) dependent variable is the logarithm of I  + investment  in
machinery in equipment to previous period's capital  stock; (ii) OLS
regression with employment as  weight; (iii) standard errors in
parenthesis;  (iv) *** (**) [*] denotes  significance  at the 1, 5, and 10
percent  level;  (v)  percentage  change  is  calculated  as
(dinvlinv)/(dxlx)=[(1+inv)linv]*[x/(a+x)I  where x is the mean of the
explanatory variable and a is relevant constant; (vi) F-test the joint
hypothesis that the  coefficients on lostdays, lostdays*generator,
generator are zero, with p-values  in parentheses.Figure 1:  Major Constraints  to hivestment
1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
Poor utility services and  ____________________  ____________
high prces
High  taxes  and  poor  tax
administration
High  interest rates and
lack of finance
Corruption
Cost of raw materials
1 = no problem, 4  major problem
Note: The managers  were asked  to rank 24 potential  bottlenecks.  Some  of these were close  in both
ranking  and interpretation  (poor utility service and high utility prices; high  taxes and poor tax
administration;  high interest  rates and lack of access  to finance), and were therefore  combined.
Source:  Reinikka and Svensson, 1999.
Figure 2: Distribution  of Firms According  to Number of Days Without Power
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Source: Estimated investment  rates based on regression 1,  table 3; with all control variables evaluated  at
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